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The use of smartphones worldwide is growing very fast and also the malicious attacks have 
increased. The mobile security applications development keeps the pace with this trend. The 
paper presents the vulnerabilities of mobile applications. The Android applications and de-
vices are analyzed through the security perspective. The usage of restricted API is also pre-
sented. The paper also focuses on how users can prevent these malicious attacks and propose 
some prevention measures, including the architecture of a mobile security system for Android 
devices.  
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Introduction 
Today, mobile applications security is 
very important taking in account the high 
number of mobile devices and users. World-
wide, about one million people were infected 
by mobile malware in the first semester of 
2011 [1]. According to [2] only 4% of smart-
phones and tablets use antimalware and anti-
virus software  and in the same period the 
number of mobile applications containing 
malware  on  marketplaces grew from 80 to 
400 [3]. In [4] is presented a history of the 
most important mobile malware and several 
tools that can be used for malware analysis. 
The market share of Android based devices is 
increasing very fast and due to its open 
source system many attackers are focusing 
on it. 
The objective of this paper is to present the 
main aspects related to Android applications 
security. Also, it is proposed a mobile system 
architecture used to prevent mobile malware. 
The paper is structured as follows. 
The section Mobile applications security is-
sues  presents the  main concerns related to 
mobile applications security and possible 
negative effects. 
Android Applications Security Model section 
focuses on the main characteristics of Andro-
id security framework, focusing on the per-
mission system. 
Accessing restricted API in Android presents 
code examples used to access the SMS, loca-
tion, telephony  and  file system services  in 
Android applications. 
The section Prevention Measures deals with 
best practices to avoid the use of malicious 
software on a mobile device. Also, there are 
presented Android cryptography classes and 
a practical example is given. 
The paper ends with conclusions and future 
work. 
 
2 Mobile Applications Security Issues 
Mobile devices are vulnerable to attacks as 
any other computers even the number of at-
tacks is still reduced compared with personal 
computers. 
The following  technologies that  exist  on 
many mobile devices can be used by attack-
ers to send and/or receive confidential data, 
malicious applications and to make unautho-
rized actions:  
•  Bluetooth – applications use it to connect 
to other devices; 
•  Telephony – unauthorized phone calls are 
made, resulting in high costs or unautho-
rized recordings; 
•  Messaging (Short or Multimedia Messag-
ing Services) – used to send confidential 
content to attacker or to access paid num-
bers; 
•  Wireless networks – used to connect to 
Internet to transfer data; 
•  NFC (Near Field Communication) – used 
for unauthorized payments. 
Data services are used in order to transfer 
from and to malicious applications. The 
Internet access allows sending/receiving  e-
mail messages and unauthorized access to 
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Internet resources (Web sites, Web services, 
Internet servers etc.) 
The behavior of malicious applications could 
vary from annoying messages to very unre-
coverable damages. The possible actions are: 
•  annoying messages; 
•  unwanted web pages opened; 
•  advertising popup; 
•  higher costs resulting from messages sent 
(SMS, MMS), phone calls and payments; 
•  unauthorized use of personal information 
data; 
•  confidential data transferred on a remote 
location; 
•  altering data stored in file system, con-
tacts, messages etc. 
Depending on the platform and/or operating 
system, applications can: 
•  read and write contacts;  
•  read and write calendar entries; 
•  read short/multimedia messages; 
•  send e-mail messages, SMS and MMS; 
•  make phone calls; 
•  get location; 
•  access the internet; 
•  read and write on file system. 
Not all operating systems and platform allow 
all of these actions that can be dangerous if 
they are used by a malicious application. 
Also the user is not always informed about 
these actions when install the application. 
 
3 Android Applications Security Model 
Android operating system is based on Linux 
kernel so that applications isolation, the file 
system and security rules are Linux specific. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, users can inte-
ract with Android device using Linux shell 
provided through adb tool. Usually develop-
ment devices have root access granted with 
full rights, but this access is not available on 
most of the Android devices. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Android command line shell 
 
Android applications files are packed in files 
with  apk  extension. These files contain all 
the classes and resources required by the ap-
plications  [5]. The binary classes are con-
verted into a proprietary format for Dalvik 
Virtual Machine (dex  files).  Usually, when 
applications are launched for the first time, 
the dex files are optimized and the resulting 
files are stored in /data/dalvik-cache directo-
ry.  When the same application is launched 
again, the optimized code is loaded from that 
special directory. 
Each application runs in a separate virtual 
machine,  having its own  unique identifier 
(UID) Figure 2. Due to this, application re-
sources are protected from other applications 
and the communication and data transfer be-
tween applications has a high degree of con-
fidence. Even so, applications could commu-
nicate each other using messages, this being 
another source of threat. 
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Fig. 2. Android applications 
 
Android applications can be installed from 
various sources, including: 
•  Android Market 
•  Alternative online shops 
•  Own developed applications 
•  Other sources: third-party developers, 
unauthorized sites etc. 
The applications published on Android Mar-
ket by the developers do not need approval 
from Google like the application published 
on App Store (Apple) or Marketplace (Mi-
crosoft). 
Android applications need to be signed be-
fore they will publish on the Android Market. 
The certificate can be generated using key-
tool and jarsigner Java tools manually or au-
tomatically. zipalign tool is used to optimize 
the apk file after it has been signed [6]. 
Applications need user permissions in order 
to access restricted API. According to [7], 
application permissions fall in one of these 
categories: 
•  normal - the features used by the applica-
tions don't presents any risk for applica-
tions or system and the user is not in-
formed when the applications is installed; 
•  dangerous – the application has capabili-
ties that, if used by malicious code, could 
produce negative effects and the user 
must be aware of these; 
•  signature  –  the applications  need to be 
signed and the signature has to be the 
same as that used to define the permis-
sions; 
•  signature or system – this is required for 
system applications  (installed in system 
folder) and it is not available for normal 
applications. 
All Android applications need users' permis-
sion in order to access potentially dangerous 
features. All permissions required need to be 
declared in application's AndroidManif-
est.xml file like this: 
 
<uses-permission android:name=  
"android.permission.INTERNET"> 
</uses-permission> 
   
Table 1 presents several Android permissions 
required to use restricted API. 
 
Table 1 Android application permissions 

























Get location  ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
 
If the permissions are not included in the ap-
plication's manifest file, that will lead to a 
run-time exception. 
Android security model is based on these 
permissions that the users have to be aware 
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Fig. 3. Android applications installation process 
 
Figure 3 depicts the process of application 
installation on an Android device. If the user 
doesn't accept the permissions required by 
the applications the installation process will 
end,  otherwise  the application will be in-
stalled on the device. 
Also, applications can define custom permis-
sions that can be use to access their re-
sources. The permission access is similar and 
these have to be declared in application's 
manifest file. 
Attackers write their own applications or 
modify existing ones by reverse engineering. 
For example, an existing application pub-
lished on Android Market could be modified 
and malicious code inserted and published on 
the Market with a different name or on a pub-
lic Web site.  After an Android package is 
modified (apk file) it has to be signed again.  
There are specialized tools for decompiling, 
modification and compiling Android binary 
files such as: 
•  APKTool [8] – used for compile and de-
compile  apk  files;  resources and xml 
files can be modified easily; 
•  smali  [9]  –  assembler and dissasembler 
for Dalvik binary files (dex files); 
•  dex2jar  [10]  –  converts Dalvik binary 
files (dex  files) into Java archives (jar 
files) that contain  standard Java class 
files;  
•  JD-GUI [11] – decompile a class file into 
a Java source file. 
These tools and similar ones are also used for 
malware analysis. 
 
4 Accessing restricted API in Android  
All restricted API used in Android applica-
tions requires permissions due to potentially 
dangerous consequences when used by mali-
cious code. Attackers could use very easily in 
their malicious code the services provided by 
the: 
•  SMS and MMS; 
•  e-mail system; 
•  telephony; 
•  personal information  system (calendar, 
contacts); 
•  file system; 
•  location providers. 
In this respect, several examples will be pro-
vided. 
In order to send SMS, after the SmsManager 
is initialized, the message is immediately sent 
as follows: 
 
SmsManager mesaj =  
  SmsManager.getDefault(); 
mesaj.sendTextMessage("1234", null, "SMS 
de test", null, null); 
 
If the default settings are used, the not null 
parameters are the phone number and the 
message text. This code doesn't tell anything 
about the operation success. It has to be im-
plemented with specific intents. The user is 
not aware about the success or failure of this 
action (sent or delivered). 
Malicious application can install a Broadca-
stReceiver for incoming messages in order to 
get access to private information. As the 
messages arrive, they are received by the ma-
licious application and processed. An exam-
ple of this type of receiver is presented in the 
next section. 
In order to make a phone call, the specia-
lized activity needs to be called: dialer or 
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Uri nrTel = Uri.parse("tel:1234"); 
Intent apelTel =  





Uri nrTel = Uri.parse("tel:1234"); 
Intent apelTel2 =  
 new Intent(Intent.ACTION_CALL, nrTel); 
startActivity(apelTel2); 
 
In both cases user will be aware of the calls if 
he or she looks at the screen. 
For accessing the external storage, the appli-
cation needs to have permission also  (like 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE). The fol-





//get the external storage state 
String stareSD =  
Environment.getExternalStorageState(); 
           




   //get the directory  
   File rootSDDir =  Environment. 
getExternalStorageDirectory(); 
        
   if (rootSDDir != null) 
   { 
     //read and write files 
   } 
}  
catch (IOException ex) 
{ Log.e("PDM1", ex.getMessage());  } 
 
It is important to check the status of external 
media to avoid exception. 
To access the location the GPS and network 
can be used. The location providers will send 
to associated listener the device location: 
 
//initialization  





//associate the listener  
locationManager.requestLocationUpdates( 





//location listener implementation 




public void onLocationChanged(Location 
poz)  
 { 
if (poz != null) 
  { 
   //use location: 
 //poz.getLatitude( 








The ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission 
is required to run the code properly.  If the 
GPS is unavailable, the LocationManag-
er.NETWORK_PROVIDER can be used, but 
with less accuracy. 
In [12] is presented an example of an Andro-
id application that uses Web services to 
access remote data. The Web services could 
be hosted on the attacker's servers and to be 
used to upload users' private data collected 
using some of the presented examples. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Application permissions screen  
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Figure 4 shows an example of an installation 
process, when the user is informed about the 
permissions required by the application. 
These permissions are required when using 
some of code presented above. 
If the user is not sure about the application he 
or she can cancel the installation process. 
Another potential risk is the possibility to 
access the native code using NDK. 
 
5 Prevention Measures 
Installation from trusted sources and based 
on other users reviews and scores is very im-
portant when installing an applications. If 
there will be complaints from users regarding 
the spyware or malware built in the applica-
tion the users will be informed. 
Users have to read carefully the application 
permissions and if they have doubts regard-
ing the application intentions they have to 
cancel the installation.  It is very important 
for users to know the permissions with higher 
risks and to check them with the application's 
features. 
Many free applications require full Internet 
access for advertising. 
Another option is to install applications that 
monitor the system for malicious code pre-
venting the infections. The number of these 
applications is growing due to increase num-
ber of malicious attack. 
One solution will be to encrypt their users' 
sensitive data using specialized applications 
or using their own applications. Such kind of 
system can encrypt and decrypt data on re-
quest or they can monitor services and activi-
ties and make these actions on the fly, as data 
arrive (SMS, e-mails, SQLite databases inter-
rogations, files etc.). 
Figure 5 shows the components of the pro-
posed system. Messages sent by the system 
or applications are intercepted by specialized 
broadcast receivers implemented as services 
(or applications). Received data is encrypted 
and stored in a database or on the external 
storage.  Some of the intercepted messages 
are not delivered to default applications in 
order avoid to write plain data on the file sys-
tem or databases. When data is required by 
some  applications, it  is  extracted from the 
SQLite databases, decrypted, and sent to 
those applications.  
 
Fig. 5. Cryptographic system architecture  
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The package includes classes for symmetric 
key cryptography (AES, DES), public keys 
encryption (RSA, DH) and message digests 
(MD5, SHA-1 etc.). 
The following example uses DES algorithm 
(with  ECB mode and PKCS#5  padding 
scheme) to encrypt and decrypt strings. Be-
cause it uses strings as parameters it is neces-
sary to convert to ASCII characters only the 
encrypted text in order to maintain its integri-
ty [13].  
 
import javax.crypto.*; 




 public static String decripteazaDES(String sir, SecretKey cheie) 
 { 
  String sirDecriptat = null; 
     
  try 
  { 
   Cipher cifDecriptare = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding"); 
   cifDecriptare.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, cheie); 
   sirDecriptat = new String(cifDecriptare.doFinal(Base64.decode(sir))); 
  } 
  catch(Exception ex) 
  { Log.e("PDM1", ex.getMessage());  } 
  return sirDecriptat; 
} 
   
 public static String cripteazaDES(String sir, SecretKey cheie) 
 { 
  String sirCriptat = null; 
     
  try 
  {  
   Cipher cifCriptare = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding"); 
   cifCriptare.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, cheie); 
   sirCriptat = Base64.encode(cifCriptare.doFinal(sir.getBytes("UTF8"))); 
  } 
  catch(Exception ex) 
  { Log.e("PDM1", ex.getMessage());  } 




The class SecCD is used for encryption and 




  //secret key is generated here 
  SecretKey cheie =  
KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES"). 
generateKey(); 
  //plain text to be encrypted 
  String mesajDeCriptat =  
    "Criptare cu DES"; 
  //encrypted text           
  String mesajCriptat =         
    SecCD.cripteazaDES( 
mesajDeCriptat, cheie); 
  //decrypted text           





{ Log.e("PDM1", ex.getMessage());} 
 
Using a similar approach all confidential data 
can be encrypted on the device. The classes 
could be easily adapted to be used with file 
streams and arrays of bytes. 
The encryption will be applied for example 
to text and e-mail messages. In the following 
example an SMS receiver is implemented in 
order to get the messages before any other 
application: 
 
private String SMS_RECEIVED_ACTION = 
"andro-
id.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED";  
     




public void onReceive(Context context, 
Intent intent)  
{ 
        
 String act = intent.getAction();  
 if(act.equals(SMS_RECEIVED_ACTION)) 
 { 
  Bundle contMesaj = intent.getExtras(); 
             
  if (contMesaj != null)  
  {  
     Object[] cont =  
       (Object[])contMesaj.get("pdus");  
     SmsMessage mesaj =  
     SmsMessage.createFromPdu( 
     ((byte[])cont[0]));  
                         
      //here we encrypt the message 
      // mesaj.getMessageBody()                 
      //stop broadcasting the message 
      abortBroadcast(); 
     } 




Before register the receiver, an IntentFilter is 
initialized with the required action 
(SMS_RECEIVED) and the priority is set to a 
higher value in order to receive the message 
before other applications: 
 
IntentFilter smsFilt =  






It is important to unregister the receiver when 





In order to work, the SMS_RECEIVE permis-
sion is required. 
It is very important to focus on quality espe-
cially when building this type of application. 
In [14] and [15] is analyzed this aspect and 
several quality metrics were developed. 
These metrics helps to obtain high quality 
mobile applications. 
The disadvantage of this security system is 
that it could slow down the system and may-
be, some  applications have to be replaced 
with similar ones. 
6 Conclusions and future work 
Mobile applications security is very impor-
tant today due to increasing number of users 
and the importance of personal and confiden-
tial data stored on mobile devices.  
Users' role is very important in reducing se-
curity threats. They have to be aware about 
the risks they expose when installing applica-
tion from unknown or unsafe sources. Also, 
users have to pay attention when they install 
application to permission required by the ap-
plications. If the applications don't suppose 
to need some kind of permission the installa-
tion process has to be cancelled. 
It is very important to remember that an im-
portant source of infection with malware is 
through the Web browser. 
The system security can be improved by us-
ing specialized applications. Another option 
is to write applications that will encrypt and 
decrypt all private data as they are accessed 
in order to assure its confidentiality. 
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